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EXTINGUISHMENT OF PERSONAL LIABILITY ON
MORTGAGE NOTES BY MERGER
GLEN W. MCGREw'
P ERSONAL liability of one who makes notes secured
by a mortgage on real estate and who later transfers
the fee title subject ot the mortgage, has been a matter
of intense personal concern to many individuals during
the recent period of steadily declining real estate values.
Every possible avenue of escape from this liability is
now being explored by worried and harassed debtors and
their attorneys. Many have taken the bankruptcy route.
Others have been fortunate enough to find that extensions
of the time of maturity have been given to the grantee
for a consideration, without the maker's consent, which
relieves the maker of his obligation to pay the mortgage
notes. A few other fortunate mortgagors are able to
pass the burden on to a grantee who assumes and agrees
to pay the debt and who is solvent, or to one who, though
taking only subject to the debt, later conveys to a second
grantee who assumes and agrees to pay the debt. It is
the purpose of this discussion to examine one avenue of
escape which is open, under Illinois decisions, to the
maker of notes in a situation such as the following:
A mortgagor sells his equity in the premises; the pur-
chaser then procures a second mortgage loan thereon and
defaults in payments due on this junior encumbrance,
1 Member Illinois Bar; Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College
of Law.
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which is thereupon foreclosed. The owner of the second
mortgage bids in the property at the foreclosure sale and
eventually procures a master's deed. He then purchases
the first mortgage and starts suit at law against the
maker of the first mortgage notes. The latter, against
whom judgment is rendered, is of course subrogated to
the rights of the plaintiff, owner of the land by fore-
closure of the second mortgage, against the land pledged
as security for payment of the first mortgage notes on
which judgment was rendered and can foreclose his lien. 2
This is in many instances small consolation, however,
for the land obviously is now worth less than the amount
of the first mortgage: if this were not so, the plaintiff in
the suit at law knowing that a foreclosure by the defen-
dant would immediately follow judgment in the plain-
tiff's favor, would not have sued. The plaintiff would
gain nothing by his judgment at law, for he could recover
only what he paid for the notes, unless he purchased
them at a discount. But the real purpose of the suit at
law is not to recover the purchase price of the notes; it is
to compel the maker of the first mortgage notes to reim-
burse the second mortgagee for all or part of his fore-
closure costs, by making the defendant purchase the title
from him. The defendant would meet the plaintiff's
terms to avoid the necessity of financing his own fore-
closure suit with its attendant delay in acquiring the
title.
It is apparent that there should be some relief, in equity
if not at law, from such "sharpshooting" tactics. From
the facts, at first impression, an adequate defense at
law would hardly be expected. Yet one exists in Illinois,
for the Supreme and Appellate Courts in several suits
at law which have been reviewed by them, have said
that the acquisition of the mortgage notes by one who
also owns the land pledged as security for the payment of
those notes, results in a merger which extinguishes the
personal liability of the maker of the notes. This defense
is good at law.
2 Howard v. Burns, 279 Ill. 256.
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An early case on the subject is that of Mines v. Moore,3
which was an action of assumpsit on four promissory
notes-part of an original series of fourteen notes-all
secured by a mortgage. The other ten notes had fur-
nished the basis for a previous foreclosure, in which the
decree expressly directed that the sale was to be made
subject to a lien to secure the payment of the four notes
not yet due. The case was tried on a plea of the general
issue by the court, a jury having been waived by agree-
ment. The lower court gave judgment for the defendant,
holding the sale was a satisfaction of the entire indebted-
ness. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
lower court, and based its decision on the case of Weiner
v. Heintz.4 In answer to the argument that the case of
Weiner v. Heintz was in equity on a bill to redeem and
did not decide that an action at law on the notes would
not lie, the court said:
Nor can it be objected that the defense cannot be made at
law. When the purchase was made, the bidder, in view of the
terms of the decree, would first ascertain the sum he would
have to pay on these notes, and then determine how much the
land was worth above that sum. Appellant, being purchaser in
this case, would of course determine how much he could give
for the premises after satisfying the notes, and he no doubt bid
with that view, and thus became the purchaser, and satisfied the
notes. And in an action of assumpsit, almost any defense, show-
ing the satisfaction or discharge of the debt, may be shown
under the general issue. And we think this defense [that the
notes were extinguished by operation of law] might clearly be
relied on in this case.
This ease is cited in Kelly v. Fahrney5 as authority
for the admission under the general issue in assumpsit
of anything that shows payment. The same case also
cites Wilson v. King,6 where it is held that the defendant
8 41 11. 273.
4 17 Ill. 259.
5123 Fed. 280.
6 83 Ill. 232.
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may give in evidence, under the general issue, any matter
which shows he was not indebted to the plaintiff when the
action was brought, whether he never was indebted, or
the liability was extinguished after it was incurred. That
the debt was extinguished by merger of the title to the
land and notes certainly shows there is no liability at the
time of the suit.
Yet Mines v. Moore seems to have been overlooked by
both court and counsel in the case of Hester v. Frary.7
This also was a suit in assumpsit upon mortgage notes
purchased by the owner of the fee title two days before
they were due. He claimed to have purchased them as
an investment for the plaintiff, although the plaintiff, at
the time of purchase, had no knowledge of the notes nor
funds in the hands of his supposed agent, the owner of
the fee, with which to purchase them. The court called
attention to the apparent motive of the owner of the
fee in making the purchase and the absence of any ade-
quate motive for the plaintiff to purchase, as an invest-
ment, paper which would mature in two days. It pro-
ceeded to consider the case as if the owner of the fee
were the owner of the notes, and held that a merger of the
debt and the fee title resulted, extinguishing the notes. A
merger is presumed under such circumstances, unless,
in equity, there is shown a contrary intention on the part
of the owner of the fee. This intention did not exist
here, nor would it avail if it did, for this was an action at
law. The Court said:
For this purpose, we are of opinion that the intent to prevent
a merger could not be presumed even in a suit in equity, and
certainly not in an action at law, from a mere lack of any
intention expressed that there should be a merger.
The doctrine of prevention of merger is a rule of equity juris-
prudence, and this action is at law. Appellant is no party to
the note sued on by reason of having executed or indorsed it.
The only ground upon which this action in assumpsit could lie
7 99 Ill. App. 51.
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against him is that he has assumed the indebtedness evidenced
by the note. But the debt is extinct if there was a merger, and
the recovery could not in that event be had.
The principle is also clearly set forth in Donk et al.
v. Alexamnder et al.,8 where appellant company had pur-
chased property subject to certain attachments and later
purchased a judgment upon which one of the attachments
was based.
It [appellant] occupied, to the extent of the amount of that
judgment, the position of both debtor and creditor, and in such
cases, there is a merger of the qualities of debtor and creditor,
extinguishing both. Abbott, in his Law Dictionary, vol. 2, title,
"Merger," says: "Merger is the equivalent of confusion in the
Roman Law, and (when used with reference to demands), indi-
cates that where the qualities of debtor and creditor become
united in the same individual, there arises a confusion of rights
which extinguishes both qualities; whence, also, merger is often
called extinguishment." Bouvier, in his Dictionary, vol. 2, title,
"Merger," under the head of "Rights," says: "Rights are
said to be merged when the same person who is bound to pay
is also entitled to receive. This is more properly called a con-
fusion of rights, or extinguishment. When there is a confusion
of rights, and the debtor and creditor become the same person,
there can be no right to put in execution." The same rule is
recognized in Pomeroy's Equity, vol. 2, sees. 789, 790. The
extinguishment is complete at law, though in equity, under cer-
tain circumstances, a merger or extinguishment will be prevented.
The case of Lily v. Pabmer summarizes the matter
thus:
The status of the plaintiff then, was this: By the conveyance
from Backer, and from Hall, the first mortgagee, the estates of
both mortgagor and mortgagee became vested in him.
The deed from Palmer to Backer made the land the primary
fund for the payment of the notes to Hall, of which the note
8 117 Ill. 330.
951 Ill. 331.
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in suit was one, and when the plaintiff took the deed from
Backer, he became the owner of that fund, and he then stood
in the attitude of a mortgagee who had effected a strict
foreclosure.
In Maulding v. Sims,10 after quoting at length from the
two Supreme Court cases of Donk v. Alexander and Lilly
v. Palmer, the court says:
These last-mentioned cases are all law cases and we think
are directly in point, and if the doctrine laid down in these cases
is the correct one, there can be no right of recovery in the cases
here involved. So far as the record discloses, appellant pur-
chased at the foreclosure sale the premises covered by the mort-
gage to him, subject to the mortgage indebtedness to the trustee
of schools and Wilson. After the sale to him, appellant took
an assignment of the notes and these mortgages, and in law it
amounted to a payment therefor, it being a matter of indif-
ference whether the indebtedness be paid directly, or whether
an assignment is taken to the person who holds the fee.
To the same effect is the recent case of Grossman v.
Lifshitz."
Although these decisions clearly indicate that there is
a good defense at law in such suits, other Illinois de-
cisions have held that the defendant may secure an in-
junction in a court of equity against the prosecution of
the suit at law and have the notes sued upon surrendered
and cancelled. The earliest case on the subject is that of
Weiner v. Heintz,12 in 1855. Weiner had given a mort-
gage of lands to secure the payment of two notes, one
payable in ten months, the other in five years and ten
months. lleintz, as assignee of the original mortgagee,
foreclosed the mortgage as to the first note, and the sale
thereunder was specifically decreed to be made subject
to the lien of the mortgage for the payment of the re-
maining note; Hieintz purchased at this sale and received
10 213 Il1. App. 473.
11 261 IM. App. 523.
12 17 Ill. 259.
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a deed expressly subject to the lien of the mortgage for
the amount of the remaining note, which was owned by
Heintz. Weiner's bill in equity prayed that he be let
in to redeem (the period of redemption had expired),
and for an injunction restraining Heintz from a. suit at
law which he had instituted against Weiner on the re-
maining note.
The right to redeem was denied, but the mortgagor was
held to be entitled to relief against the collection of the
note not due at the time of the rendition of the foreclosure
decree.
The land was sold to pay the note then due, and subject to
the incumbrance of the mortgage, to the extent of the amount
of the note, not then due. Such are the provisions of the decree
under which the sale was made, and of the deed to the pur-
chaser.
The purchaser took the land subject to the incumbrance,
became mortgagor to the extent of that note, and the land
continued subject to the payment of the note, whoever should
be the holder of the note or the owner of the fee, and equity
would enforce payment out of the land. The purchaser is pre-
sumed to have bought the land at its value, less the amount
of this note, and equity will not permit him to hold the land
and collect the note from Weiner. Besides, the note is paid
by operation of law. Heintz owned the mortgage debt, and got
the fee of the land by his deed, under the decree, thereby becom-
ing substantially mortgagor and mortgagee.
The mortgage, and, with it the debt, therefore, merged in the
fee, and could no longer exist. Where two titles or interests in
land become united in the same person, in the same right, and
at the same time as that of mortgagor and mortgagee, the lesser
will merge in the greater estate and become extinct; unless there
be some interest or intention to the contrary, or the merger
would work an injury to some one. .
Here no motive could exist to keep the debt alive; for in
equity the land would be made to pay the debt, and the owner
of the debt was, at the same time, the owner of the land.
-CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
It is to be noted that the merger is not that of the legal
estates of mortgagee and owner of the fee, but of "titles
or interests "in land. This is better illustrated by the
case of Belleville Savings Bank v. Reis et al.,13 where the
bank owned a first mortgage, and also a junior en-
cumbrance secured by a trust deed on the same property.
The trust deed was foreclosed by the bank and the prop-
erty was bid in at the master's sale by the president of
the bank and a certificate of sale issued to him, but no
master's deed was issued within five years from the ex-
piration of the period of redemption, and the right to
a deed had therefore expired. The fee title therefore
never vested in the purchaser at the sale, or in any as-
signee of said purchaser, but the court nevertheless said:
"We do not think it makes any difference in the applica-
tion of these principles to the case in hand that no mas-
ter's deed has ever been issued to the holder of the
certificate of purchase."
No case has been found in this state wherein the holder
of a certificate of sale has been enjoined from prosecut-
ing a suit at law on notes secured by a mortgage or trust
deed on the land purchased, and to the lien of which the
purchase was expressly subject. But if, as the court said
in the decision last above quoted, it makes no difference
whether a master's deed is ever issued to the holder of
the certificate after the expiration of the period of re-
demption, it likewise cannot be said that it makes any
difference that the holder of the certificate is not yet en-
titled to a deed because the period of redemption has not
yet expired. Regardless of the anomalous character of
the property right which the holder of such a certificate
has,'14 if he also becomes the holder of notes secured by
a prior lien on the premises, and subject to which lien
his purchase was made, no reason appears why a court
of equity should not enjoin a suit at law by the bolder of
the certificate of sale on such notes. He has acquired
such notes for his own protection; he is both debtor and
18 136 11. 242.
14 Bradley v. IAghtcap, 202 I1. 154.
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creditor, and the two qualities should be held to have
merged, with the result that all personal liability on the
notes is thereby extinguished.
In the comparatively recent case of Sleichert v. Turek,15
it does not appear from the decision as reported whether
the defendant had assigned his certificate of sale before or
after he purchased the first mortgage notes upon which the
suit at law which was enjoined had been brought, but a
tender of the amount due on the notes having been made
and brought into court, it was ordered that the defendant
accept the sum so tendered and surrender the notes, and
that he be perpetually enjoined from prosecuting his suit
at law and from impairing, discharging, or releasing the
notes. This decision is of course based on the com-
plainant's right to be subrogated to the lien of the trust
deed securing the payment of the notes sued upon. None
of the cases that we have discussed are cited in the de-
cision, nor by counsel in their briefs. An examination
of the briefs discloses that the defendant had purchased
the first mortgage notes and started suit thereon before
his second mortgage foreclosure had gone to decree. He
bid in the property himself and the master's certificate of
sale was issued to him; at the time when he received the
certificate, he was also the owner of the first mortgage
notes on which he had previously started suit at law.
The court indicates that to have the suit at law enjoined
a tender of the amount due should be made.
But it is submitted that even if no tender is made, the
suit at law should nevertheless have been enjoined, upon
the authority of the cases above discussed. The rights
of the parties are determined at the sale, not at the ex-
piration of the period of redemption, when the master's
deed issues. By bidding at the sale, the bidder in effect
says that the property is worth the amount of the first
mortgage, plus the amount of his bid. He has bought the
property, subject, it is true, to the right of redemption,
but his bid is made with full knowledge of that right, and
the fact that he does not become the absolute owner until
15 259 Il. App. 467.
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that right has been extinguished by the running of the
period of redemption should not give him the right to
acquire notes secured by a lien to which his purchase
was subject, and sue at law thereon. If the right to
enjoin such a suit only exists after the plaintiff in the
suit has received the master's deed, then he need only
refrain from taking such deed until he has recovered
judgment on the notes.
The case of Rogers v. Meyers,16 requires some com-
ment. It was cited in Sleichert v. Turek, by the appel-
lant, as authority for the denial of the injunction sought,
but the court attempted to draw a distinction by pointing
out that no tender had been made in Rogers v. Meyers.
A careful reading of the case shows, however, that the
real ground for distinction is that in Rogers v. Meyers,
the plaintiff in the suit at law was a bona fide assignee
of the original mortgagee and neither of them had ever
purchased the mortgaged premises, subject to the lien
of the mortgage securing the note sued upon, at judicial
sale or otherwise.
The increase during the past two years in the volume
of mortgage foreclosures, and the decline in the value of
real estate, both of which are without precedent, at least
in this generation, will doubtless result in the near future
in additional Appellate and Supreme Court decisions
which will clarify the law of Illinois upon the questions
involved.
16 68 Il1. 92.
